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We argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political 
parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. 
Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may 
pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for 
nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may 
reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership 
contracts. This holds even though anticorruption laws also bind political parties. 
JEL Code: D72, D85, L14. 
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Anti- corruption laws forbid trading attractive nominations made by politicians. But even
though interested citizens are not able to buy such spoils, it pays o¤ to be on good terms with
the politicians. Citizens buy tickets to fund- raising events and spend time with politicians
to be remembered when nominations are made. If there are no restrictions on to whom
politicians can allocate jobs, citizens can gain by rubbing shoulders with several politicians.
This is time- consuming both for citizens and for politicians and results in wasteful network
formation. Here, political parties can provide valuable services.
Political parties are powerful gatekeepers in modern democracies. Citizens looking for
positions of trust, and politicians allocating these, cannot belong to more than one party. As
political parties can require their politician members to give the nominations to other party
members, parties can reduce wasteful network formation between citizens and politicians. On
the other hand, there is an additional linking cost when parties are present: parties also need
to build links to politicians.
We compare network formation with and without the role of the political parties. We take
as our starting point that political parties exist and that politicians distribute non- ideological
spoils, such as nominations to positions of trust or hire civil servants who do not make political
decisions. We ask whether the gatekeeping role of the political parties improves e¢ciency in
the distribution of such spoils. We also ask who gains and who loses from the parties meddling
in the network formation.
Our argumentation above suggests that party membership should be correlated with the
value of the spoils that politicians distribute. Indeed, there is such a link: In Figure 1, we show
how the share of voters belonging to a political party (in 1997 to 2000) is related to the total
compensation costs for the public sector (as a percentage of GDP).1 If Austria is excluded2, the
correlation between party membership and total compensation is 0.53. A weaker but positive
relationship holds for party membership and the GDP share of the public sector (taken from
Statistics Finland 2005): without Austria, the correlation is 0.28. The case of Austria in itself
also lends support to our analysis. In Austria, political parties are well represented in the public
administration with many …rms and organizations having traditionally double heads –one for
the Social Democrats, one for the Conservatives. The strong politicization of nominations has
been associated with exceptionally high level of party membership. (Encyclopedia of Austria
(2005))
In our model, the party has full control of the network formation of its members. We focus
on the networks used to allocate non- ideological spoils; for concreteness think of positions of
trust in a municipality. In addition to providing exclusivity, political parties allocate each join-
ing member to a unique politician belonging to the party. Political parties … rst pay politicians
1We include those European countries which where established democracies already before the fall of Com-
munism, and for which data exists on both: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The data is from
Mair and van Biezen (2001) and OECD (2001).
2Austria is an outlier: there 17.7 percent of voters belong to a political party, while the share in all other
countries is between 1.6 and 9.7 percent. The R- Student Residual for Austria is 12.47, well above the 5 percent
critical value of 1.96.




































































Figure 1: The size of the public sector and party membership
for joining and then sell links to politicians to rent- seeking citizens.3 In equilibrium, parties,
politicians, and citizens have rational expectations about the network structure. Equilibrium
prices are determined by these expectations and inter- party competition.
Also in the no- party equilibrium, expectations about the equilibrium network structure
are rational. The equilibrium prices are determined by competition between politicians on the
one side and citizens on the other side of the market. Given prices, politicians and citizens
choose the number of links they sell and buy, respectively.
The more time citizens or politicians spend rubbing shoulders, the higher the opportunity
cost of the time spent doing so. Thus, linking costs are convex and, in equilibrium, the prices
of links are determined by marginal costs.
We …rst derive the equilibrium networking structure and the equilibrium payo¤s in the
no- party and in the party equilibrium. We show that a no- party equilibrium always exists and
that the existence of a party equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model. Finally, we
study the welfare properties of the equilibria.4
We …nd that the net e¤ect of intermediaries on social surplus depends on networking
costs, the value of lucrative nominations, and the relative numbers of politicians, citizens and
parties. Therefore, a welfare- maximizing government may well … nd it optimal to promote the
involvement of political parties in some cases, and actively discourage it in others.
Notice that allocating one rent- seeking citizen to each politician would minimize the cost
3Note that payments may take form of services, in addition to money.
4We refer only to the dimension of allocating the non- ideological spoils. Indeed, the role of the political
parties in distributing positions of trust and governments jobs has varied both between countries and over
time.
2of network formation. Hypothetically, parties have two ways of accomplishing this: either by
selling upcoming nominations within the party or by allowing in only one citizen per each
nominating politician. Yet, so as to the selling policy, anti- corruption laws bind also political
parties. At the same time, pre- commitment not to accept additional members is prohibited
since this would violate equal rights to political participation.5
We also …nd that politicians would be better o¤ if political parties were not involved in the
distribution of rents while citizens may gain from their presence, despite the fact that parties
charge membership fees from citizens and transfer money to politicians! Even so, a party
equilibrium may be incentive- compatible in that no single politician would …nd it optimal not
to link with the party, provided that others do.
Our model has common features with several strands of literature. First, we suppose that
for a citizen to receive a spoil from a politician, a connection must be established between the
two. This relates the current paper to the literature on cooperative networks, pioneered by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, in our model agents may trade in the right to control
network formulation. This di¤erentiates our model from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and
the subsequent literature.
Second, in our model, the citizens compete for rents initiated by politicians as in rent-
seeking and lobbying contests literature (Tullock (1967, 1980), Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Besley and Coate (2001)
and Helpman and Persson (2001)). Yet, there are two major di¤erences. In our model, links are
costly for both citizens and politicians and endogenous, and require mutual consent. Payments
are made in exchange for establishing links. In rent- seeking and lobbying literature, links are
exogenous and costless, and payments are bids in an auction or in a contest. The only previous
contribution that endogenizes the relationship between politicians and lobbyists is Felli and
Merlo (2006). Our approach is complementary to theirs. Whereas they analyze ideological
lobbying, we analyze lobbying on non- ideological spoils, like nominations and government
contracts. Furthermore, Felli and Merlo (2006) assume that the links are costless. Throughout
the analysis, we assume that anti- corruption laws work6. Therefore, we have implicitly in mind
a modern democracy with relatively low level of corruption. Previous literature on contests
has already analyzed extensively the case where anti- corruption laws can be circumvented.
Third, our model is related to two strands of intermediation literature, the middlemen
literature (Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)) on the one hand, and the literature on two- sided
markets (Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2004)) on the other hand. In our model,
the intermediaries, or the platforms, are the political parties. Our approach di¤ers from
these earlier contributions most importantly in that the intermediary plays a useful role by
restricting the activity between the two sides of its market.
There are two features which separate politics and political parties from other areas of
intermediation. The …rst one concerns the legal framework. Anti- corruption laws restrict the
5We could generate the motivation not to restrict network formation by assuming that some citizens want
to join parties to seek for rents, while others for ideological reasons. Those joining parties for ideological
reasons favor a no- restriction policy.
6The inability of politicians and citizens to trade nominations when these arise could result from outside
monitoring or from there being a fraction of honest citizens and politicians who would report asking or o¤ering
bribes, provided that punishments for corruption are su¢ciently high.
3ability of politicians and citizens to enter even into informal contracts on allocating projects
in exchange of payments. In other areas of intermediation (like the market of goods and ideas)
the two sides are typically allowed to enter into private contracts on the underlying goods or
services, rather than just on linking together. The second di¤erence is in the services that
the intermediary provides. In previous literature, intermediaries are used only if they provide
additional services in reducing search costs between the two sides of the market, information
revelation of the underlying good or economizing transaction costs. We …nd that political
parties need not provide any of these services; the service they provide is exclusivity -one
cannot be a member of several political parties.
Fourth, our explanation complements previous e¢ciency rationales for the prominent role
of political parties. For example, Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Spear (1988) …nd that po-
litical parties may reduce policy ‡ uctuations, compared with the case in which subsequent
cohorts of competing politicians with di¤erent preferences would engage in one- shot electoral
competition. Caillaud and Tirole (2002) show that political parties may make up voters’in-
formation de…cit by designing and endorsing electoral platforms. These previous contributions
leave the puzzle of why intermediaries arise also in cases where they do not reduce the time
spent searching, provide additional information, or solve various commitment problems. For
example, it is questionable as to what extent a political party would provide new information
when … lling positions of trust or public jobs in a small municipality. Yet, even these positions
and many other jobs are typically earmarked to di¤erent political parties. Our explanation
for the role of a political party applies even in these cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
equilibrium payo¤s and linking in the absence of parties, and section 4 in their presence.
Section 5 explores whether politicians prefer a network with or without parties, and whether
an eventual party equilibrium is incentive compatible. Section 6 presents a welfare comparison,
and section 7 empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
There are nt agents of type t, and there are three types t 2f A;B;Cg. Type A is called a
politician, i =1 ;:::;n A, type B is called a citizen, j =1 ;:::;n B and type C is called a party
boss, k =1 ;:::;n C. The politician receives a chance to distribute a project with probability
p.7
Each politician is indi¤erent to which citizen to give the project. Also, each citizen is
indi¤erent as to which politician from whom she receives the project. Yet, for politician i to
be able to give the project to citizen j, there has to be a direct link between them. Party bosses
can connect to citizens indirectly, through politicians, but they need direct links to politicians.
Note that our framework allows analyzing politics at di¤erent levels. At the national level,
party bosses would be leaders of the national parties. At the municipal level, they would be
local leaders, and politicians could then be, for example, members of the municipal council.
Whichever the level, politicians require having a direct access to their party boss. We take the
7All the results would remain the same also if the politician would receive a certain surplus, in case a project
is ful…lled.
4identities of party bosses as exogenous8. Citizens can be interpreted as individuals interested
in positions distributed by elected politicians or they can be interpreted as representatives of
corporations interested in public projects, the allocation of which depends on decisions made
by politicians.
The strength of a link between agents a and a0 is denoted maa0. Obviously, the strength of
the link from a to a0 must equal the strength of the link from a0 to a, thus, maa0 = ma0a. There
is an indirect link between a and a0, when there is a third agent a00 to whom both a and a0 are
linked. We denote an indirect link between a and a0 by „aa0. Maintaining a direct link requires
time, and may require other costs. A decreasing marginal productivity in other activities,
or an increasing marginal utility of leisure, implies that the marginal cost of time spent on
networking is increasing. Furthermore, networking with competing agents simultaneously may
pose additional challenges. For example, a politician who seeks to extract contributions from
competing contractors may need to spend more time in convincing these of the bene… ts of
giving. To capture these features, we model the marginal costs of networking as increasing. A





where c is a positive linking cost parameter independent of a player’ s type.
The total amount of links in a network without political parties need not be an integer.
Formally, the width of each link is between zero and one, zero implying no link at all and one
implying a complete link. The width of a link can be thought to be proportional to the time
spent in maintaining the link. The probability weight that each link receives when a politician
allocates projects to citizens is proportional to the width of the link.
The width of potential links with political parties, on the other hand, is restricted to be
either zero or one. This re‡ ects the di¤erences between the formal relationships with political
parties and the informal relationships between citizens and politicians. We assume that the
number of agents is su¢ciently large that citizens never … nd it attractive to maintain full links
to all politicians.
3 Networks without Political Parties
Assume that there are more citizens than politicians, 0 <n A<n B. In this section, we assume
that the political parties do not participate in the network formation between politicians and
citizens looking for projects distributed by politicians. There are ￿ times more citizens than
politicians, nB = ￿nA;￿ 2f 2 ; 3 ;:::g.9 If there are several citizens linked to a politician, we
assume that the politician allocates the project randomly, so that the probability that each
citizen is chosen is proportional to the width of the link. Thus the probability of getting the
8In a richer framework, we could model overlapping generations of politicians, with all young politicians
being of type A and one of the old politicians becoming the party boss in the second.
9This simpli…cation allows us to solve the model explicitly. Otherwise, the model would have to be solved
numerically.





Citizens are able to pay politicians for networking even if the citizens cannot pay for the
projects. For example, citizens interested in nominations can give campaign contributions to
candidates or volunteer their time. Explicitly requiring a politician to assign a nomination
in exchange for such contribution, on the other hand, would be considered bribing and not
lobbying.
A citizen has to pay politician i a reward, ri, for maintaining a full link. If the link is only
partial, then the reward is reduced proportionally. Note that this is a gross price, and it has
to compensate the politician for her marginal cost of linking. In addition to paying politicians
ri for maintaining the links, citizens have to pay their own linking costs.




































for j =1 ;:::;n B. We assume that each citizen acts atomistically11 taking as given the reward,




















Thus, the …rst order conditions write
ps
miB




for i =1 ;:::;n A.
It is easy to see that each politician is indi¤erent so as to which citizens are linked to her.
She only cares about the aggregate amount of links to citizens, miB. Also, as long as linking
10This formulation coincides with Tullock (1980) with R =1 . Yet, the decision variable is not the cost of
e¤ort, but rather, the number of links and the cost of linking is not linear but convex in the number of links.
11The appendix shows how the equilibrium derived here corresponds to an equilibrium of a dynamic game.
Notice that the atomisticity implies that, in the party equilibrium of section 4, there is no strategic own- side
membership externality e¤ect (see Rochet and Tirole, 2004) even if such an e¤ect is non- strategically present
in our model.
6rewards and the aggregate amount of links, miB, are equal across politicians, each citizen
is indi¤erent so as to how to allocate the links between politicians. All that matters is her
aggregate amount of links, mjA. Since linking cost functions are convex and identical across
politicians and citizens, the number of links is equal across politicians, on the one hand, and
across citizens, on the other hand. Equilibrium rewards are equal to the politicians’marginal
linking cost. Thus, citizens equate their own marginal linking cost and the equilibrium reward,
c
PnA
j=1 mji + rN




AB is the total amount
of links in the equilibrium from a politician to citizens and rN
BA is the equilibrium reward.
Furthermore, we denote by mN
BA the total amount of links that a citizen has to politicians in
equilibrium.
This allows us to derive the no- party equilibrium12. We summarize it as proposition 1:
























It is now straightforward to calculate the equilibrium surpluses. These are summarized in
proposition 2:







which is increasing in p;sand ￿:







which is increasing in p and s and decreasing in ￿.
12We use the superscript N for the equilibrium values of endogenous variables in the no- party equilibrium.
Similarly, superscript P is used for the party equilibrium in section 4.
7Proof. The equilibrium payo¤s follow from plugging the equilibrium demand, supply and
reward of the previous proof into the payo¤ functions.
The politician bene… ts from the scarcity of politicians, whereas the opposite holds for the
citizen. As the number of citizens per politician increases, the demand of links of each citizen
decreases but the demand per politician increases. Thus, due to marginal cost pricing and
convex costs, the pro…t of the politician increases. Yet, for the citizen the strength of the link
per each politician decreases and, thus, so does the probability of getting the project. Yet,
the reward that needs to be paid is higher. Hence, the payo¤ for the citizen decreases.
Surprisingly, the cost parameter of maintaining links enters neither the politician’ s surplus
nor that of the citizen13. This implies that the e¢ciency gains due to the reduction of the cost
of maintaining the links are wasted in additional network formation.
Notice that for any parameter values of the model the total amount of links in the equilib-
rium is positive and both the citizen and the politician receive a positive surplus. This implies
the following proposition that establishes the existence of a no- party equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For any feasible parameter values of the model, there exists a no- party equi-
librium.
4 Networks with Political Parties
In this section, we introduce political parties as intermediaries that join together politicians
and citizens. The service that the parties provide turns out to be the exclusivity of links:
no politician or citizen can link to a member of another party. This reduces the wasteful
multiplication of links to each politician. Yet, there are costs to this as well, since each
politician must now link to the political party in addition to the citizens.
A party boss, whose type is denoted by C, exerts control rights over his party (or its local
unit in the municipality interpretation). He maximizes the party’ s surplus, net of his own
linking costs.14 Assume that there are ` politicians per each party boss, where ` 2f 2 ;3 ;:::g
Therefore, nA = `nC and as nB = ￿nA, nB = ￿`nC. We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The party boss receives the right to control and design the
network of all the politicians and citizens linked with him on the condition that
the party bears all the linking costs.15
Assumption 2. Political parties, represented by party bosses, sign exclusive
contracts that state that citizens linked to them are not able to sign up with other
political parties. The political parties cannot commit not to sign contracts with
additional politicians and citizens.
13This result is not in the core of our analysis. It may be due to the functional forms and may not be robust
to other speci…cations.
14We do not take a stance whether party bosses would keep the surplus, or part of it, for private consumption,
or if they use the surplus for ideological purposes.
15If the party would not bear the linking costs, then the party boss would have an incentive to require
politicians to build more links ex post than they have agreed on ex ante.
8Assumption 3. When citizens make their linking decisions, they know how many
politicians belong to each party.
Assumption 4. Keeping up the links between politicians and citizens requires
e¤ort or resources, like in the case with no political parties. Also, links between
party bosses and politicians require maintaining.
Assumption 5. The party bosses play the active role, making take- it- or- leave- it
o¤ers to the politicians and citizens.
Assumption 6. There must be a direct link between the politician and the citizen
who carries out the project initiated by the politician.
4.1 Properties of Party Equilibrium
In this subsection, we focus on an equilibrium where all politicians and citizens are party
members -every politician and citizen has a direct or an indirect link to a party. In the
next subsection, we establish conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium when each
politician and each citizen must collect a non- negative payo¤ for joining a party. This provides
an individual rationality condition with a zero outside option. A positive payo¤ outside option
for the politician is considered in section 5.2. There we study whether a politician has an
incentive not to join a party and link to citizens without the control of the party.16
For notational simplicity, the number of links that an agent of type t has to t0 types is
denoted by the same variable for all agents of the same type. This is restrictive in general but,
as in the no- party equilibrium, it turns out to be a property of any equilibrium: all agents of
the same type have an equal number of links and pay and receive equal payments. There will
be no direct payments between politicians and citizens since the party regulates all links.17
Yet, by assumption 6, the structure of the network within a party always includes direct links
between politicians and citizens.
We denote the reward that each citizen pays to the party boss by rBC and the reward that
each politician gets from the party boss by rCA. A payment is made independently of the type
of the link but the cost of a link is born only from direct links. We show in the next subsection
that both rBC and rCA are positive when the individual rationality constraints are satis…ed.
16We do not consider equilibria in which the value of the project is so low that not all citizens are willing to
link to a party even if all politicians are party members.
17Note that citizens often pay the party in the form of volunteer work. Our framework could be generalized
to allow for this, without changing the qualitative results. Then the interpretation would be the following.
Each citizen pays to the party in the form of work up to the point in which the marginal cost for citizen equals
the marginal bene… t for the party. The di¤erence between the monetarized value of this e¢cient work e¤ort
and the equilibrium payment is settled in money. Party bosses may then let citizens (or part of them) work
directly for the politician, thus transferring part of the compensation in kind to the politician.
9The party’ s pro…ts are















The …rst term is the sum of rewards paid by the citizens to the party net of the citizens’
linking costs paid by the party. The second term comprises the rewards to politicians and
their linking costs paid by the party. The third term consists of the party’ s own linking costs.
By assumption, there must be a direct link between the politician and the citizen who
carries out the project. This being the case, the optimal structure of the network is such
that the party boss is directly linked to the politicians and each politician is linked directly to
citizens. There are no direct links between the party boss and the citizens. Thus, (7) reduces
to














Equally, the citizen’ s expected payo¤ is
…B = pBs ¡ rBC:





Finally, a politician linked to a party receives a surplus equalling
…A = rCA:
In the party equilibrium, each citizen and each politician is linked to a party. The next
propositions 4 to 6 characterize the party equilibria
Proposition 4 In any party equilibrium, each party boss is linked to ` politicians and `￿ citizens.
The number of direct links are mP
AB = ￿, mP
BA =1 ,m P
AC =1;m P
CA = `, mP
BC =0=m P
CB.
Proof. In the appendix.
In addition, we can derive the equilibrium rewards paid by the party and the citizen and
the equilibrium probability that a citizen gets the project.







and each citizen pays the party a reward
r
P
BC = c(￿ + 2) (10)







Proof. In the appendix.
The equilibrium network structure is based on two principles. First, the party is forced
to build direct links between the citizens and the politicians. This being the case, it is less
costly to the party boss to build his own links to the citizens via a politician rather than
directly. Moreover, allocating an equal number of citizens to each politician minimizes the
cost of linking.
Second, competition drives the bene…t from an additional link equal to its marginal cost.
Having a unique market reward and unequal number of links would violate the condition of
zero marginal net bene…t. The one with less links could apply the cheapest network structure
described above and get the same reward with a lower marginal cost. Hence, the number of
links for any two agents of the same kind in the market must be the same. The rewards are
such that the parties are indi¤erent between selling an additional link to a citizen, or buying
an additional link to a politician, and sticking to the equilibrium number of links.
Due to the marginal cost pricing and the fact that each politician is allocated an equal
number of citizens, the reward paid by the citizen to the party, (10), increases in ￿, the number
of citizens per politician, and in c; the linking cost parameter.
Again, due to marginal cost pricing, the reward that a party pays to the politician equals
the rewards from ￿ citizens linked to the marginal politician, less the marginal politician’ s
costs of linking to the ￿ citizens and the linking cost of those citizens to the politician, less




2, increases in ￿ and in c: On the other hand, the party’ s marginal cost of linking
to the politicians increases in c and ` since each party links to ` politicians in equilibrium.
Hence, the equilibrium reward to politician decreases in ` and increases in ￿. As both the
gross surplus per politician and the marginal cost of linking to politicians increase in c, its net
e¤ect on the reward that political parties pay politicians is uncertain, a priori.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium payo¤s.



















¡c(￿ + 2): (13)
11Proof. These follow from inserting the equilibrium demands and rewards into the surplus
expressions.
The comparative statics of these equilibrium payo¤s are straightforward:





























The following corollary identi…es cases where the citizen’ s party equilibrium payo¤ is higher
than her no- party equilibrium payo¤:





2(￿ + 2)(￿ + 1)￿
(2￿ + 1)
: (14)
Above we found two countervailing e¤ects of the linking cost c on the party’ s equilibrium
payo¤: the gross surplus per politician increases in c and the marginal linking cost to politicians
increasesin c. Proposition 7 shows that the gross surplus per politician e¤ect always dominates.
Proposition 7 reveals a con‡ ict of interest among the agents concerning the cost parameter.
Whereas politicians and political parties actually prefer a higher cost of networking, citizens
prefer a lower one. That politicians and parties bene…t from an increasing transaction cost
follows from competition between politicians. When selling links to the citizens, the political
parties charge a reward, rP
BC, equal to the marginal cost of adding one additional link. A
lower value of the cost parameter would result in lower rewards and thus in lower equilibrium
payo¤s to the parties and politicians.18
4.2 Existence with Individual Rationality Constraints
Let us now assume that each politician and citizen can refrain from joining a party, in which
case they would receive a payo¤ of zero. The condition for the existence of a party equilibrium
is then characterized in proposition 8:
Proposition 8 There is a party equilibrium with …P
A ¸ 0 and …P
A ¸ 0 where each citizen and
each politician links to a unique party if and only if
ps
c
¸ ￿(￿ + 2) ¸ 2` +2+￿ (15)
18This suggests that parties and politicians might object to technological innovations that might reduce the
costs of networking -such as political participation via the internet.
12that is if and only if the number of citizens per politician is not too small or too large, the
linking cost and the number of politicians per party boss is su¢ciently small, and the expected
rent is su¢ciently large.
Proof. These results follow from the assumption that rCA ¸ 0 and from the requirement
that …P
B ¸ 0.
The positive payo¤ constraints create bounds for the number of citizens per politician.
The condition ￿2 + ￿ ¸ 2` +2is a requirement that when a politician links with a party, the







is not negative. This holds as long as the number of citizens per politician is su¢ciently high
relative to the number of politicians per party. A positive reward is in line with what we
observe in politics: political parties typically pay their politicians in the form of campaign
contributions etc. rather than the other way round, and members pay parties membership
fees rather than parties paying members.
The equilibrium payo¤ of the citizen, (13), is non- negative if and only if the …rst inequality
in (15) holds. Increasing the number of citizens per politician su¢ciently makes a citizen’ s
expected surplus negative.
Combining the positive payo¤ conditions with (14), we notice that it is possible that the
citizen prefers the no- party equilibrium to the party equilibrium or vice versa. Another point
of interest, which we report as a corollary to proposition 8 is that, in the party equilibrium,
the number of citizens per politician is smaller whenever the party equilibrium exists.
Corollary 2 If the party equilibrium exists, then the number of citizens linked to each politi-
cian is smaller in the party equilibrium than in the no- party equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
A si nt h ee c o n o m ya saw h o l e ,a l s oi ne a c hp a r t y ,t h e r ea r e￿times more citizens than politi-
cians by proposition 4. Thus, if the party let its politicians and citizens freely interact with the
only restriction that none of its politicians or citizens could interact with non- members, the
equilibrium payo¤s would not be a¤ected vis- à- vis the no- party equilibrium. Yet, the party
enforces the network design within the party so that each citizen is linked to one politician
only. The total amount of links per politician ￿ in the party- equilibrium is always smaller




5 Preference for Party Membership
In the equilibrium derived above, the party provides link exclusivity and network design ser-
vices for the citizens and the politicians. The individual rationality constraints guarantee that
each politician and each citizen rather links to the party than remains inactive. Yet, on the
one hand, we do not know whether the politicians prefer the no- party equilibrium to the party
13equilibrium. If they did, they might be able to make a collective binding decision not to link
with any political parties and gain. On the other hand, given that all the other politicians
are linked to a party, each politician might prefer not to link with a party and build up her
own network instead. We call a party equilibrium where the politician’ s payo¤ is higher than
the outside option of staying out of any party and creating own network instead an incentive
compatible party equilibrium.
In this section, we study whether the politicians prefer to link directly to citizens. We … rst
study the pro…tability of a coordinated and collective shift by the politicians from the party
equilibrium to the no- party equilibrium. Second, we study the pro…tability of a unilateral
deviation of a single politician from linking with a party to linking with citizens directly when
all other politicians remain linked with the political parties. Notice that if a deviation by
a single politician from the party equilibrium pays o¤ but a collective deviation does not,
then, from politicians’perspective, the structure is similar to that of a prisoner’ s dilemma.
We show …rst that politicians always prefer the no- party equilibrium to the party equilibrium,
and second that with some parameter values, a deviation by a single politician pays o¤ whereas
with others it does not. Thus, a dilemma structure never arises.
5.1 Politicians’Preferences Concerning the Equilibria
We next identify which of the equilibria is the politicians’preferred equilibrium. Politicians
prefer the no- party equilibrium to the party equilibrium if the surplus in the former, (5), is
greater than the surplus in the latter, (12). Hence, the condition that each politician prefers







2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2): (17)
When (17) holds, the no- party equilibrium is preferred by the politicians. The next proposition
shows that the politicians prefer the no- party equilibrium.
Proposition 9 The politicians prefer the no- party equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
This result is not surprising in the light of corollary 2. The total amount of links per
politician ￿ in the party- equilibrium is always smaller than the total amount of links per
politician in the no- party- equilibrium,
q
￿ps
(￿+1)c. But, when competing for the politicians, the
parties pay politicians a reward equalling the marginal bene…t of that politician to the party
which on the other hand is just ￿ times the pro… t that it makes per citizen that becomes a
member of the party. This latter, on the other hand, is smaller than what the politician makes
per citizen in the no- party equilibrium since, as shown above, the total amount of links per
politician is smaller in the party- equilibrium.
5.2 Incentive Compatible Party Equilibrium
If a politician cannot be prevented from not linking with a party and linking with citizens
directly, the equilibrium surplus for a politician has to be greater than or equal to the surplus
14of the politician linking directly with citizens. Studying a politician’ s incentives to remain
linked with a party when all other politicians are linked with a party is the focus of this
subsection. We assume that a deviating politician is able to make take- it- or- leave- it reward
o¤ers to citizens potentially willing to link. The politician is unable to commit not to sell
additional links. Therefore, she sells links until an additional link would give her a negative
payo¤. This determines the number of citizens that will link to the politician. In equilibrium,
the citizens anticipate the total amount of links that a deviating politician would like to sell.
We show that there are cases where the politician prefers to deviate and others where she does
not.
Proposition 10 There are feasible parameter values for which the party equilibrium is incen-
tive compatible and others for which it is not.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
6 Welfare
The aggregate surplus in the no- party equilibrium, de…ned as W N, equals
W











In the party equilibrium, the aggregate surplus W P equals
W












The next proposition gives a necessary and a su¢cient condition for the party equilibrium
to create a larger surplus:
Proposition 11 W P ¸ W N if and only if ￿2 +3 ￿+`+1·
ps
c :
Proof. In the appendix.
When (i) the number of politicians per party, `, (ii) the number of citizens per politician,
￿, and (iii) the linking costs, c, are su¢ciently small vis- à- vis the citizen’ s expected share of
the project, ps, then the intermediation is socially preferred.
Note that we have cases when the party equilibrium creates a smaller surplus even if it exists
and cases where the party equilibrium creates a larger surplus and, yet, the market agents may
coordinate the no- party equilibrium. To see this, suppose that the second inequality in the
existence condition for the party equilibrium, (15) holds, that is ￿(￿ + 2) ¸ 2` +2+￿. This
can be achieved, for instance, by setting ￿ ¸ ` =2 . The …rst inequality in (15) sets a lower
bound for
ps
c . This inequality is far less stringent than the condition of proposition 11. When
the latter holds, so does the lower bound for
ps
c in (15). Thus, if we choose a large enough
ps
c ,
the party equilibrium exists and generates a larger surplus than the no party equilibrium. Yet,
when we choose
ps
c such that 2`+2+￿ ·￿(￿+2) ·
ps
c <￿ 2+3￿+`+1, the party equilibrium
exists but generates a lower surplus than the no- party equilibrium. Thus, depending on the
15parameter values of the model, intervention may be needed in order to enforce the no- party
equilibrium or the party equilibrium depending on the parameter values of the model.
The politicians prefer the no- party equilibrium, and they have an incentive to bring about
institutions to guarantee its emergence. Sometimes, the interest of the social planner coincides
with the interest of the politicians and promoting the emergence of such institutions may be
in the planner’ s interest. Yet, when the party equilibrium is preferable, the social planner
should make every e¤ort to prevent the emergence of such institutions. Furthermore, even the
politician’ s individual incentives may render the party equilibrium unstable for instance if the
linking costs are su¢ciently low.
7 Empirical Evidence
Our framework suggests that the value of belonging to a political party is increasing in the value
of rents distributed by politicians to citizens. Our simple model assumed that potential party
members are identical. With heterogeneous citizens, a member’ s valuation of belonging to a
party should translate into di¤erent levels of party membership, rather than just to di¤erent
membership fees, costs and personal investments. If the chance to be nominated to a post by
a politician of the party is an important motivation to join political parties, then the number
of citizens willing to pay the costs for joining should be increasing in the total value of these
nominations.19 The latter can be approximated by the GDP share of total compensation to
public sector workers. Similarly, if citizens join to seek rents distributed through government
contracts then the public expenditures share of GDP should be positively related to party
membership.
As reported in the introduction, there is a strong correlation between the share of voters
belonging to a political party and the total compensation costs for the public sector employees
as a percentage of GDP. The following series of regressions con… rms this: Table 1 has four
regressions for the countries in Figure 1, excluding Austria.20 In the …rst regression, we use
the total compensation costs for the public sector (as a percentage of GDP) as an explanatory
variable for the share of voters belonging to a political party. The e¤ect is statistically signif-
icant at the 10 percent level. In the second regression, we control for the e¤ect of population
size. This is intended to capture the possibility that citizens may be politically more active in
small countries for reasons outside our model, like greater proximity in smaller communities.
In the third regression, we use as an additional control the logarithm of GDP per capita eval-
uated at the purchasing power parity. This acts as a control for di¤erent levels of economic
19As an important part of the costs of and fees for belonging to a party are non- monetary, like providing
voluntary work, it is not possible to test our model simply by studying membership fees in di¤erent countries.
20Data from Mair and van Biezen (2001), OECD (2001), OECD (2005) and Statistics Finland (2005).
16development. In the fourth regression, we control for both at the same time.
TABLE 1. Explaining party membership.
Dependent variable: share of voters belonging to a political party (N=13)
Intercept 1.073 12.156 - 38.521 - 16.971
(1.677) (6.569)* (44.318) (43.803)
Compensation costs (as % of GDP) 0.311 0.163 0.353 0.204
(0.150)* (0.162) (0.158)** (0.177)
Log of population - 0.989 - 0.912
(0.565) (0.590)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 3.897 2.790
(4.358) (4.146)
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.361 0.203 0.300
p- value 0.062 0.051 0.130 0.107
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. * (**) denotes signi… cance at the 10% (5%) level.
Given the small number of countries, our results should be interpreted as suggestive, rather
than as strict tests of the theory. Nonetheless, our … ndings lend some support to our model.
Party membership is positively related to the value of rents that politicians distribute, as
measured by the compensation costs of public sector workers relative to GDP. This relationship
is weaker, but does not disappear, when additional controls are used. Moreover, we run the
regressions using the GDP share of public expenditures indicating the extent of politically
distributed rents, rather than just compensation costs relative to GDP. The results turned out
qualitatively similar, but with statistically weaker e¤ects.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a novel explanation for the role of political parties: party politicians
only distribute rents to other party members, thus cancelling out the incentive of non- members
to seek rents and spend resources in constructing links to the parties’ politicians. This reduces
link formation and enables the party to create value for the party members. Indeed, our em-
pirical analysis suggests that party membership is more common in countries with a bigger
public sector. To di¤erentiate the role of public employment from general income redistrib-
ution, we focused on the compensation costs of the public sector employees as percentage of
GDP.
We take as our starting point anti- corruption laws which forbid citizens from paying politi-
cians directly for nominations or publicly commissioned projects. These laws still allow citizens
(or …rms) to pay for gaining access to politicians, for example by buying tickets to fund- raising
events, volunteering, and making campaign contributions. Competition for politicians’atten-
tion results in wasteful network formation, which political parties may alleviate, when citizens
can belong to only one party. Political parties can reduce network formation costs by at-
taching each party member to a given politician, rather than allowing them to build links
to several politicians. Similarly, political parties require politicians to give projects to their
party’ s members.
17It should be highlighted that anti- corruption laws also restrict the activities of political
parties. They are not allowed to trade in nominations or projects directly, but only to receive
membership payments and allocate funds to politicians’campaigns. Even political parties are
unable to fully eliminate wasteful network formation, as they cannot commit to restricting the
number of members.21
Even though political parties may save network formation costs, they need not. There
are two reasons for this result which may at … rst glance appear counterintuitive. First, the
use of political parties typically necessitates more formal network structure (there are only
two degrees of strengths of the link, either there is a link or there is not). Politicians and
citizens, on the other hand, may have more informal links with varying degrees of strength of
the link. Second, maintaining links to the political parties is costly. When parties are present,
the network must cover the parties in addition to politicians and citizens, creating a need for
additional links.
The use of political parties improves welfare whenever the linking costs, the number of
politicians per party boss and the number of citizens per politician are su¢ciently low and
the expected rent for the citizen is su¢ciently large. Yet, when the number of citizens per
politician or the number of politicians per party boss is high, but not too high to prevent the
party equilibrium from emerging, the no- party equilibrium is socially preferred.
We also …nd that politicians would be better o¤ without political parties while citizens may
gain from their presence, despite the fact that parties charge membership fees from citizens
and transfer money to politicians. This surprising result arises as payments by citizens might
be even higher without parties. Even so, a party equilibrium may be incentive- compatible in
that no single politician would … nd it optimal to deviate from it, provided that others do not.
If a party equilibrium results in higher welfare, the problem of the social planner is to prevent
the emergence of politicians’collective bodies that would guarantee the coordination of the
no- party equilibrium. If the party equilibrium results in higher welfare and is not incentive-
compatible, then the society may change this by increasing the costs of individual politicians
to deviate from it. This may explain, for example, why public money to political campaigns
is often channelled through political parties, rather than directly to politicians.
Our framework raises several topics for further research. First, we could endogenize the
identity of politicians in the citizen- candidate tradition pioneered by Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Second, we could endogenize the identity of party bosses
by presenting an overlapping generations framework in which party bosses arise from senior
politicians. Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that electoral rules have signi…cant
consequences on the organization of political parties and on economic policy. To what extent
do these di¤erences arise through the role that political parties play in network formation?
21Allowing political parties to pre- commit not to take additional members would disenfranchise those citizens
not belonging to the selected few from fully participating in the political life.
189 Appendix
9.1 Foundation for the atomistic approach
We suppose that in the no- party equilibrium, citizens and politicians decide their optimal
demands given the market price and in addition citizens do not take into account the e¤ect of
their demand on the total amount of links of the politician. In this appendix, we give a game
theoretic foundation for this approach.
We suppose that the links are created before the politician’ s term of o¢ce or the election.
We let the e¤ective strength of the link, me
ji, be a function not only of the strength, mij, but
also of the timing of the creation of the link. It is more likely that the project is given to
someone whom the politician has known for a longer time. If the …nite but continuous time
interval during which links are built is normalized to one, let –ij be the fraction of time that
elapses before a link between i and j is created. Then the e¤ective strength of the link is
me
ji = mij(1 ¡ –ij).
If politicians post take- it or leave- it rewards at each point in time and the pairwise strengths
of the links are settled based on the posted rewards, the emerging market equilibrium would
correspond to the static equilibrium of section 3:
9.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. If all agents of the same type behave identically in aggregate demands and supplies in
equilibrium, the supply of links equals the number of agents times the total amount of links















Thus, acting atomistically, the probability that a citizen gets a project when she acquires a
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9.3 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. 1) Let us …rst assume that each party has ￿ citizens for each politician linked to it. The
equilibrium reward must be such that the party is indi¤erent on whether to sell one additional
link or not. Selling one additional link would increase the linking costs of the politician to
whom the citizen would be linked from
c
2(￿ + 1)2 to
c
2(￿ + 2)2. In addition, the party would
have to pay c
2 for the new citizen’ s linking cost as we assume that the party bears all linking
costs. The marginal increase in the linking costs then equals c
2(2￿ +4 )=c ( ￿+ 2). For any
party, the net gain that a party would derive from selling a link to one more citizen cannot be
positive, since then it would provide an incentive to deviate and sell a link to an additional
citizen. Hence, rP
BC · c(￿ + 2): On the other hand, it is not possible that the net gain is
negative, rP
BC <c ( ￿+2), since then each party could increase the reward that a citizen has to
pay up to c(￿ +2). This is because for every party rP
BC · c(￿ +2) and hence no party strictly
prefers o¤ering a link to an additional citizen and the citizen cannot do anything but remain
with her party even with the higher reward. Thus,
r
P
BC = c(￿ + 2): (27)
2) Let us now show that given that each party has mCA politicians, the equilibrium number
of citizens is mCA￿. Suppose that there are two political parties, C0 and C00 and that the number








CA: Then, since all citizens








CA. But then using the cheapest structure described in point (1) of the proof,
for all politicians linked to C00 the number of links m00 is smaller than or equal to ￿ +1 . Yet,
for the party C0 there must be a politician for whom the number of links m00 is strictly greater
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0 + 1): (28)
The reward r0
BC of the party C0 must be higher than or equal to (2m0 +2). Otherwise, the





0 + 2) >c ( m
00 + 2):
Thus, party C00 makes a pro…t by selling a cheaper additional link to a customer of C0 and the
customer has a higher or equal probability of getting the project with C00 than with C0 and




















CA + 1): (29)
The bene…ts to thepartyare the payments fromall citizens linked to the politicians, mP
CA￿rP
BC:The
costs include the payment made to the politicians mP
CArP
CA; the linking costs of politicians paid
by political parties, mP
CA
c

























Substituting from (27), the payment rP
CA is given by (29).
4) Let us now show that any network structure where for some party, mCA 6= `, cannot
be an equilibrium. Suppose that there are two political parties C00 and C0 with m0
CA <m 00
CA.





CA + 1) to the
politicians linked to it. Otherwise, the last additional politician would deteriorate the payo¤




















and C0 can a¤ord paying rP
C00A + " for a su¢ciently small ">0 . Hence, mCA 6= ` cannot be
an equilibrium.
9.4 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. The equilibrium reward rP
BC is given by equation (27) in part 1) of the proof of







2 +￿ ¡2`¡2); (31)
21now follows from substituting rP
BC and mP
CA = ` into (30) in the proof of proposition 4 and
rearranging. By inserting mP
CA and mP
CB in equation (8), we obtain the equilibrium probability










9.5 Proof of corollary 2
Proof. By proposition 4, the number of citizens per politician in the party equilibrium









which is equivalent to




This condition holds if the party equilibrium exists by proposition 8.
9.6 Proof of proposition 9
















As we simultaneously have the participation constraint for citizens of ￿(￿+2) ·
ps
c , political
parties prefer a feasible network structure with political parties to a situation without political
parties if








For this inequality to hold, it must be that




This is a contradiction. Therefore, the party equilibrium is not preferred by the politicians.
229.7 Proof of proposition 10
Proof. Suppose that
pps
c +1¡1is a positive integer. Let us assume that the links built
by the deviating politician S have to be full links. S acts as a monopoly with respect to
citizens, making them take- it- or- leave it o¤ers of building links. Citizens correctly anticipate
the number of links n that S is going to sell.
Anticipating that the number of links that S sells is n, a citizen who is o¤ered a link is













n = r + 3c
2 .




which is increasing in r for a given n and increasing in n if for a given r, r>
c
2(2n+1): Thus,











We assume that parameters p;s; and c are such that n =
pps
c +1¡1is an integer. However,
it is easy to check that
pps




2 . Thus the optimal
r and n are r¤ =
ps p
ps
c +1¡1 ¡ 3c
2 and n¤ =
pps
c +1¡1 :



















c = x. The incentive compatibility condition is satis… ed if and only if the politician’ s










2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡2):




x +1 : (34)
In this expression, both sides are positive since x ¸ ￿2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2: Otherwise, citizens
would not be willing to buy links in a party equilibrium. By squaring both sides of (34) and
rearranging we obtain
[(x + 1) ¡ (￿
2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2)][x¡ (￿
2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2)] ¡ (￿
2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2) · 0:
Setting x =( ￿ 2+￿¡2 `¡2) will make the expression negative since (￿2 + ￿ ¡ 2` ¡ 2) > 0.
On the other hand, letting x !1makes the expression positive.
239.8 Proof of proposition 11
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